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Barnes: Tort Law
TORT LAW

VICTIMS OF THEIR OwN SUCCESS?
SOUTH CAROLINA HOSPITALS Now HAVE AN
ABSOLUTE, NONDELEGABLE DUTY TO PROVIDE
COMPETENT EMERGENCY ROOM CARE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Simmons v. Tuomey RegionalMedical Center' the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held a hospital liable for the negligent acts of emergency
2
room physicians acting as independent contractors. Under the rule announced

in Simmons, hospitals have an absolute, nondelegable duty3 to provide
competent emergency room care and services.' This ruling renders hospitals in
South Carolina strictly liable for malpractice committed by emergency room

physicians including those acting as independent contractors.5 If not altered by
the South Carolina Supreme Court on appeal,6 the Simmons rule will
profoundly affect the allocation of malpractice liability among South Carolina
health care providers.
7
The Simmons court based its decision solely on public policy,

1. 330 S.C.1 15,498 S.E.2d 408 (CL App. 1998).
2. Id. at 124, 498 S.E.2d at 413. An independent contractor is defined as "a person
who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaling. He may or may not be an agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3)
(1957).
3. The term "nondelegable duty" as used by the Simmons court and other authorities
is somewhat of a misnomer. The idea is more accurately described as nondelegable liability,
meaning that the delegator of such a duty will be liable for negligence of the delegatee. See
Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, HospitalLiabilityforTorts ofIndependent
ContractorPhysicians,47 S.C. L. REv. 431,452 (1996).
4. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 119-20,498 S.E.2d at 410.
5. Id. at 124, 498 S.E.2d at 412.
6. A petition for certiorari has been filed with the South Carolina Supreme Court. The
supreme court advance sheets dated February 27, 1999 indicate the petition is sixth among all
pending petitions for certiorari. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., Petition No. 2788 (Davis
Adv. Sh. No. 8 at iii).
7. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 119-23, 498 S.E.2d at 410-12.
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choosing not to address the actual agency' and apparent agency9 theories of
liability presented at the trial level. The court concluded that public policy in
South Carolina with respect to hospital liability for emergency room
malpractice had undergone a significant change defined by three factors:
public reliance on the availability of emergency room services,' the existence
of state accreditation regulations that require emergency room services," and
a "public perception of the unity of hospitals and their emergency rooms."' 2
The third factor weighed most heavily in the court's analysis. Because people
reasonably associate emergency rooms with the hospitals in which they are
housed rather than with the physicians staffing the emergency rooms,' 3
hospitals must be held liable for the malpractice of their emergency room
physicians regardless of the contractual, legal, or functional relationship
between the hospital and the physicians." The court noted that this changed
perception stems largely from the commercialization of hospitals and health
care in general' 5 In many respects, the hospitals have become victims of their
own success as they have actively solicited business and marketed themselves
as multifaceted health care providers.' 6
Simmons does not present any facts that would distinguish it from
typical emergency-room-negligence cases.' 7 Thus, the court's holding, if
upheld, will end the supreme court's silence on this issue and have broad
application for current plaintiffs or others allegedly subjected to acts of
malpractice by emergency room physicians. More importantly, the Simmons
holding will have long-term effects on the business operations of both hospitals
and nonemployee emergency room physicians. As hospitals and physicians
evaluate risks, they will likely renegotiate, if not fundamentally restructure, the
private agreements that define their relationships. 8 Ultimately, the Simmons
court's assertion of a public policy shift may influence hospital liability for the
malpractice of nonemergency room physicians providing medical care on

8. See Part IIJ.B for a discussion on the theory of actual agency or respondeat
superior. South Carolina courts have accepted and applied this doctrine in various contexts. See,
e.g., Sams v. Arthur, 135 S.C. 123, 128, 133 S.E. 205,207 (1926) (recognizing the doctrine of
respondeat superior).
9. See Part m.C for a discussion on the theory of apparent agency. South Carolina
courts have accepted and applied this doctrine. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 291 S.C.
62, 67, 352 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing the doctrine of apparent agency).
10. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 120-21,498 S.E.2d at 410-11.
11. Id. at 121-22, 498 S.E.2d at 411.
12. Id. at 121, 498 S.E.2d at411.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 122-23, 498 S.E.2d at 411-12.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 116-18, 498 S.E.2d at 408-09.
18. AfterSimmons, the advantages ofusing independent contractor physicians to staff
emergency rooms may be nonexistent for large organizations and greatly diminished for small
hospitals. See infra Part IV.
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hospital premises.19
Part ITof this Note describes the law governing hospital emergency
room liability as it existed in South Carolina prior to Simmons and summarizes
the facts, analysis, and authority on which the Simmons court relied. Part M
examines alternative theories of liability (and defenses ofnonliability) applied
in other jurisdictions. Part IV offers several conclusions regarding the
immediate and long-term implications of the new rule.
Specifically, this Note projects that the Simmons decision's most
immediate effect will be to provide alleged victims of emergency room
malpractice with access to another, probably deeper, pocket for relief. In
reaction to Simmons, hospitals currently contracting out emergency room
operations may decide to take over operations of their emergency rooms in
order to exert more control over the care provided and to capture the profits
currently accruing to the independent contractors. The ability of an individual
hospital to take this step will depend in large part on its size, growth potential,
and affiliation, or ability to affiliate, with a larger organization. The few
remaining small, independent hospitals in South Carolina may very well go the
way of many independent-physician practices and be forced into acquisition by
larger organizations. A more troublesome implication of the Simmons decision
for all hospitals, regardless of size, is the potential extension of the Simmons
rule to other types of medical services provided in hospitals by independent
contractor physicians. Finally, as noted below, the public policy basis for the
Simmons decision may prove to be either good or bad for hospitals depending
on how South Carolina courts interpret and apply the case.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The OldRule: HospitalsAre Not Liablefor the Malpractice
ofIndependent Contractors

The doctrine of respondeat superior 0 generally has been followed in

19. Hospitals commonly staff their emergency rooms with independent contractors
to insulate themselves from liability. This business practice is common in other high-risk areas
of medical practice such as radiology, pathology, anesthesiology, and clinical laboratories. See
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 437.
20. Under this doctrine, masters are vicariously liable for the tortious acts of their
servants acting within the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219
(1957); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-500

(5th ed. 1984). An agent is considered a servant when the agent's activities are subject to a
certain level of control by the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957). In

contrast, an agent is considered an independent contractor when this control is not present. Id.
§ 2(3). Cf. Bell v. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 318 S.C. 558, 561 n.2, 459 S.E.2d 315, 317 n.2 (Ct
App. 1995) (recognizing that an independent contractor may be an agent).
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South Carolina.2 ' The corollary rule that principals are not liable for the

physical torts of their independent contractors' is also recognized in South
Carolina.' Hence, hospitals have long taken advantage of the facets of limited
liability by employing emergency room physicians as independent contractors.
An excellent example of this is Self v. Goodrich,24 which involved a
malpractice action against an emergency room physician.' The hospital
defended the plaintiff's attempt to hold it liable on the grounds that Self failed
to introduce evidence of an agency relationship.2 6 After examining the evidence
and considering the hospital's control of the physician, the court of appeals
found that the physician was an independent contractor and affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the hospital.27
After Self the court of appeals decided two cases, Shuler v. Tuomey
RegionalMedical Center" in 1993 and Strickland v. Madden29 in 1994, both
of which involved alleged torts by independent contractor physicians
3 The plaintiffs inboth cases
performing services in hospital emergency rooms°.
asked the court to impute liability to the hospitals using an apparent agency
theory. 3' Both the Shuler and Strickland courts applied the traditional test for
liability under an apparent agency theory which requires that aplaintiff "prove:

21. Sans v. Arthur, 135 S.C. 123, 128, 133 S.E. 205, 207 (1926) (recognizing the
doctrine ofrespondeat superior). No reported South Carolina decisions indicate that a court has
fotmd a hospital liable for a physician's negligence using the doctrine of respondeat superior.
18 S.C. JUR.Hospitals§ 15 (1993). However, in Selfv. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349,387 S.E.2d 713
(Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals considered the "question of whether there is any evidence
to support a finding that [the physician] was the agent or servant of the hospital so that his
alleged negligence may be imputed to the hospital." Id. at 354, 387 S.E.2d at 716. The court
ultimately concluded that the physician was an independent contractor. Id. Presumably, a
finding of servant status would have led to vicarious liability for the hospital. McMillan v.
Durant, 312 S.C. 200, 203 n.2, 439 S.E.2d 829, 831 n.2 (1993) ("A hospital as an entity cannot
practice medicine, diagnose an illness, or establish a course of treatment; however, the hospital
may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees.").
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1957); KEETON ETAL., supra note 20,
§ 71, at 509; 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 29 (1995).
23. Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236,242,329 S.E.2d 426,429 (1985) (nonhospital
case); Conlin v. City Council, 49 S.C.L. (15 Rich.) 201, 211 (1868) (nonhospital case).
24. 300 S.C. 349, 387 S.E.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1989).
25. Id. at 350, 387 S.E.2d at 713-14.
26. Id. at 353, 387 S.E.2d at 715.
27. Id. at 354, 387 S.E.2d at 716.
28. 313 S.C. 225,437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
29. 323 S.C. 63,448 S.E.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1994).
30. Strickland,323 S.C. at 65,448 S.E.2d at 582 ("Evangeline Strickland brought this
action against Arthur Madden, M.D. and Providence Hospital seeking to recover for emotional
and physical injuries suffered when Dr. Madden informed Strickland her father had died when
in fact he was alive."); Shuler, 313 S.C. at 226, 437 S.E.2d at 129 ("Linda Shuler brought this
action for outrage againstTuomey Regional Medical Center, after the hospital's emergency room
physician misdiagnosed her as having gonorrhea. Donald Shuler claims damages for loss of
consortium.").
31. Strickland,323 S.C. at 70, 448 S.E.2d at 585; Shuler, 313 S.C. at 226-27, 437
S.E.2d at 129-30.
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(1) that the purported principal consciously or impliedly represented another
to be his agent; (2) that there was a reliance upon the representation; and (3)
that there was a change of position to the relying party's detriment."32 Each
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary elements of
apparent agency and found the hospital was not liable.33
Significantly, the Strickland court acknowledged that other
jurisdictions had adopted nondelegable duties based on the "public's perception
of and reliance on hospital[s] as multifaceted health care facilit[ies], as well as
hospital[s'] superior position to monitor and control physician performance."34
In their article published after Strickland,but prior to Simmons, McWilliams
and Russell concluded: "While Strickland does not enter into considerations
of public policybeyond its passingreference to 'public perception,' the opinion
strongly suggests that South Carolina courts will not remain immune to the
changing tide of public perception and attendant public policy....""
B.

The New Rule:
Center

Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical

Judge Howell's opinion in Simmons delivers a powerful blow to
efforts by South Carolina hospitals to insulate themselves from liability by
engaging emergency room physicians as independent contractors rather than
as direct employees. As mentioned earlier, the facts presented in Simmons are
typical of these cases. On January 24, 1994, following a head injury sustained
in a moped accident, P.J. McBride arrived at the emergency room at Tuomey
Regional Medical Center ("Tuomey").36 McBride received treatment for
contusions and was subsequently released by two attending emergency room
physicians, Dr. Cooper and Dr. Anderson.3 7 Both were employees of Coastal
Physicians Services ("Coastal"), the firm responsible for the operations of the
Tuomey emergency roompursuant to aJune 1987 contract.38 McBride returned
to Tuomey the next day where another physician properly diagnosed his head
injury as a subdural hematoma.39 McBride was transported to Richland
Memorial Hospital and died approximately six weeks later from complications

32. Shuler,313 S.C. at 227,437 S.E.2d at 129-30 (citing Watkins v. Mobile Oil Corp.,
291 S.C. 62, 67,352 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ct. App. 1986)); see Strickland,323 S.C. at 70, 448 S.E.2d
at 585 (citing Shuler, 313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at 129-30).
33. Strickland,323 S.C. at 70, 448 S.E.2d at 585 ("[T]hereis nonetheless no evidence
to support the remaining elements of reliance and change of position by Strickland."); Shuler,
313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at 130 ("Shuler fails, as noted by the trial court, to point to any
evidence from which reliance could be inferred so as to support an apparent agency theory.").
34. Strickland, 323 S.C. at 71-72,448 S.E.2d at 586.
35. McWilliams &Russell, supra note 3, at 472.
36. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 330 S.C. 115, 117,498 S.E.2d 408, 408-09
(Ct. App. 1998).
37. Id. at 117,498 S.E.2d at 409.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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involving the subdural hematoma which Dr. Cooper and Dr. Anderson had
failed to diagnose.'
McBride's daughter, Alethia Simmons, as personal representative of
his estate, brought an action against the two physicians, Coastal, and Tuomey
for medical malpractice.4 The trial court granted summary judgment for
Tuomey on the grounds that the hospital was not liable under theories of actual
agency, apparent agency, or nondelegable duty for the allegedly negligent
actions of the independent contractor physicians. 2 The trial court placed
emphasis on both the June 1987 contract between Tuomey and Coastal and a
standard hospital admission form signed by Simmons.' Both documents
clearly identified Coastal and its staff of emergency room physicians as
independent contractors of Tuomey."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and found that
"hospitals have a nondelegable duty to provide competent emergency room
services. A nondelegable duty is essentially an exception to the general rule
that principals are not liable for the torts of independent contractors."4 The
court went on to clarify the idea ofnondelegable duty as being more accurately
described as nondelegable liability." The duty can be delegated, but the
associated liability cannot, so the delegator of such a duty will be held liable for
any negligence of the delegatee4
The creation of a nondelegable duty as an exception to the general rule
that principals are not liable for the torts of their independent contractors is not
a novel concept in South Carolina.4 8 The idea of an absolute, nondelegable duty
has its roots in public policy;49 accordingly, public policy was the basis for the
Simmons holding. The court relied heavily on Dean Prosser," who long ago
recognized:
A different approach, manifested in
several of the exceptions to the general rule
of nonliability [for independent
contractors], has been to hold that the
employer's enterprise, and his relation to
the plaintiff, are such as to impose upon
him a duty which cannot be delegated to the

40. Id.
41. Id. at ll6, 498 S.E.2d at 408.
42. Id. at 116-18, 498 S.E.2d at 408-09.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 117,498 S.E.2d 408-09.
Id.
Id. at 119-20, 498 S.E.2d at 410 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 123, 498 S.E.2d at 412.
Id.
See id. at 118, 498 S.E.2d at 409.
Id. at 119-23, 498 S.E.2d at 410-12.
Id. at 120, 498 S.E.2d at 410.
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contractor ....
It is difficult to suggest any
criterion by which the non-delegable
character of such duties may be determined,
other than the conclusion of the courts that
the responsibility is so important to the
community that the employer should not be
permitted to transfer it to another.5'
The court concluded that the changed public policy in South Carolina with
respect to hospital liability for emergency room services is defined by three
factors and used these factors as the basis for its holding.-2
First, the court noted that emergency rooms, by definition, are the
health care provider of last resort: "Few things are more comforting in today's
society than knowing that immediate medical care is available around-the-clock
at any hospital."'53 Though comforting as such an availability of care may be,
the patient is in no position to bargain for services in an emergency situation
and is likely to be treated by physicians acting as independent contractors rather
than employees.54
Second, the court, quoting the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control regulations entitled Minimum Standards for
Licensing Hospitals and Institutional General Infirmaries,"5 noted that statehospital-accreditation regulations require that all hospitals provide on-site
emergency room services, personnel, and equipment twenty-four hours a day. 6
The court also noted that in the context of landlord-tenant law, statutory and
contractual imposition of specific duties was sufficient to create anondelegable
duty. 7
Finally, and most significantly, the court recognized that members of
the public now view a hospital as a single entity providing medical services.58
The public perception is that "patients come to the hospital to be cured, and the
doctors who practice there are the hospital's instrumentalities, regardless of the
51. KEETON ETAL.,supra note 20, § 71, at 511-12.
52. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
53. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 120,498 S.E.2d at 410.
54. Id. at 120-21,498 S.E.2d at 410-11 (citing Sampson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys.,
940 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998)). The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision in Sampson v.BaptistMemorialHospital
System on May 21, 1998, three months after Simmons. The Texas Court of Appeals held that
hospitals have a nondelegable duty to provide competent emergency room services. Sampson,
940 S.W.2d at 136. However, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the theory ofnondelegable duty
outright. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. 1998).
55. 24A S.C. CODEANN. REGS. 61-16

§ 613 (1992).

56. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 121-22, 498 S.E.2d at 411.
57. Id. at 122, 498 S.E.2d at411.
58. Id. at 121,498 S.E.2d at 411.
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nature of the private arrangements between the hospital and the physician.""
The Simmons court acknowledged the commercialization of the industry and
specifically cited advertising, active solicitation of business, and other
commercial efforts by hospitals as contributing to the public's perception.'
The court's recognition of this third factor-changed public
perception-as a component of public policy is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, public perception is distinguished from the other two factors, public
reliance and regulatory requirements, in that public perception has truly
undergone rapid, significant change while public reliance6' and regulatory
requirements62 have not. An opinion built on the change in public policy-if
defined only by public reliance and regulatory requirements-probably would
not have led to a radical departure from the general rule of nonliability. The
recent, significant change in publicperceptionprovided the true impetus for the
court's conclusion.
Second, public perception is the only one of tfe three factors that is,
at least theoretically, largely controlled by the hospitals themselves.
Commentators have observed that an "important driver in the shift in public
perception has been hospitals' marketing of themselves-using the tools of
mainstream commerce-as full-service healthcare providers."" Hospitals truly
are victims of their own commercial success.
In summary, Simmons establishes a powerful new theory for holding
hospitals liable for the malpractice of their emergency room physicians. Prior
to Simmons, general applicability of the doctrine ofrespondeat superior, finding
support in the court's holding in Self, established that hospitals were probably
liable for the malpractice of emergency room servants. The cases of Shulerand
Strickland provided that hospitals may even be liable for the malpractice of
emergency room independent contractors under the theory of apparent agency.
However, the Simmons rule now renders these classifications largely irrelevant.
Whether an emergency roomphysician is contractually, legally, or functionally
a servant or independent contractor-or an agent or nonagent-does not
matter; the hospital will be held strictly liable for the malpractice of its
emergency room physicians.

59. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 473.
60. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 122,498 S.E.2d at 411.
61. Public reliance on emergency rooms may have increased as the practice of house
calls by local doctors has all but disappeared, but such a change has come about gradually and
with relatively insignificant effect on the public. As health care costs have risen, uninsured
individuals and those on Medicaid have increasingly come to rely on emergency room services,
but this reliance is not likely the generalized reliance to which the Simmons court referred. See
Helena G. Rubinstein, Nonprofit Hospitals and the Federal Tax Exemption: A Fresh
Prescription,7 HEALTHMATRIX 381,412 (1997) (discussing relianceby thepoor on emergency
room services).
62. Compare24A S.C. CODEANN.REGs. 61-16 § 613 (1992), with 24 S.C. CODEANN.
REGS. 61-16 § 613 (1979). This comparison indicates that the basic requirement that hospitals
maintain a perpetually open emergency room has been in place for at least the last 20 years.
63. McWilliarms & Russell, supra note 3, at 436 (footnote omitted).
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ALTERNATIVE THEORIES EXPANDING HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR
EMERGENCY ROOM MALPRACTICE

A.

Background

The independent contractor arrangementbetweenTuomey and Coastal
is typical. Nationwide, hospitals have successfully avoided liability for
malpractice of emergency room physicians by engaging these physicians as
independent contractors or otherwise divesting themselves of control over these
physicians." The result of the Simmons case is not unusual either, as a
recognizable trend toward holding hospitals liable in this context is
developing.65 Various theories of liability have been analyzed and adopted to
impute liability to hospitals. 66 Most of these theories attack the general rule that
67
principals are not liable for the negligent acts of their independent contractors.
In most cases courts have considered more than one theory of liability, 68 and
in many cases hospitals have been found liable on more than one ground.69 A
common thread in recent applications of these theories in the hospital context
is the recognition of changed or changing public perception of hospitals and a
concomitant change in the public policy basis for holding hospitals liable.70
This Part does not discuss the intricacies of the various theories or
analyze the relative advantages and disadvantages of each as a vehicle for
holding hospitals liable. The purpose of this Part is to outline (1) the theories

64. Id. at 437.
65. Id. at 434.
66. The doctrines discussed in this Part are actual agency and respondeat superior,
apparent agency, ratification, and inherently dangerous activity. Because nondelegable duty has
been discussed previously in this Note, it will not receive treatment in this Part. This Part also
summarizes application of the corporate-practice doctrine as a defense to the theories of actual
and apparent agency. This Part does not address theories of direct liability. For a discussion of
these theories in the hospital context, see id. at 462-71. The form of direct liability most
commonly found in hospital cases is corporate negligence in failing to maintain safe and
adequate facilities and equipment; select, retain, and supervise competent physicians and staff;
promulgate and enforce rules and policies to ensure quality patient care; or keep physicians
informed of a patient's condition to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 463. See
generally Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991) (discussing the doctrine of
corporate negligence); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) (same).
67. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 434 ("The emerging view is that the
care-giving aspect of hospitals entails significant duties owed by hospitals to those within their
care and that the public is benefitted by enforcing these duties and, where injury occurs, by
giving the public access to the resources of hospitals (and their insurers).").
68. See, e.g., Sampson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W.2d 128, 133-36 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1996), rev'd,969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998) (considering the theories of apparent agency
and nondelegable duty).
69. See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527,529-30 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976) (finding a hospital liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and, alternatively,
under the apparent agency theory).
70. See, e.g., Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 330 S.C. 115, 121-22,498 S.E.2d
408,411 (Ct. App. 1998).
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of liability available to courts considering hospital liability for emergency room
malpractice, and (2) the important role public policy considerations have
played in recent jurisprudence in the area of hospital emergency room
malpractice.71
B.

Actual Agency and RespondeatSuperior

As noted above, the general rule is that principals are liable for the
torts of their servants acting within the scope of the agency relationship, but not
for the torts of independent contractors. Courts have commonly held hospitals
liable for the negligence of emergency room physicians by establishing the
existence of a master-servant relationship and then applying the doctrine of
respondeat superior.72 The decisions in which hospital liability has been
imputed range from clear cases of emergency room physicians acting as the
hospital's employees73 to less clear independent contractor cases74 requiring
very "elastic interpretations of respondeat superior."" These decisions are
generally very fact-driven, and the courts usually confine the analysis to an
examination of factors defining the relationship between the hospital and the
physician. 76 An analysis of control-including examination of both the extent

71. This Part does not discuss the doctrine of charitable immunity. This doctrine is
perhaps the oldest and most widely used theory by which hospitals have been shielded from
liability. For a brief discussion of the doctrine's demise as applied to hospitals, see McWilliams
& Russell, supra note 3, at 434-38. This portion of their article cites authority applying the
doctrine in otherjurisdictions; tracks the erosion ofthe doctrine in South Carolina; and attributes
much of its demise to the courts' recognition of the change in the operations, economics, and
public perception of the modem hospital.
72. See Daniel L. Icenogle, Annotation, HospitalLiabilityas to Diagnosisand Care
ofPatientsin Emergency Room, 58 A.L.R.5th 613, § 8, at 638-41 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Mduba, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (concluding "as a matter of law, that Dr.
Bitash was an employee of the defendant hospital and not an independent contractor").
74. See, e.g., Felter v. Mercy Community Hosp., 664 N.Y.S.2d 321,323 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (stating that "[w]hether or not a physician qualifies as an independent contractor is
a factual conclusion" to be made by the jury).
75. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 433.
76. The Restatement (Second) ofAgency provides a commonly used list of factors for
courts to consider:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether,
in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is
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of control actually exerted over an emergency room physician and the scope of
the hospital's right of control-is central in nearly all recent decisions on
hospital liability."
State and federal courts have considered numerous fact patterns in the
hospital emergency room context,78 with results differing from state to state.79
In analyzing the issues, courts use inconsistent methodologies." However, a
common thread in many of these cases is a concern for public policy, leading
some to conclude that "at least in the view of some courts, public perceptions
and patients' reasonable expectations are more important in assessing hospital
liability than are the bargained-for relationship between hospital and physician
and the policies traditionally underlying principal liability for the negligence
of agents."'"
In sum the doctrines of actual agency and respondeat superior are
vibrant and available to emergency room plaintiffs given the right set of facts.
However, these facts must relate not only to the hospital-physician relationship,
but also to the plaintiffs andpublic's view ofthe allegedly controlling hospital.
C.

Apparent, Implied, or Ostensible Agency (or Agency by
Estoppel)

Application of the doctrine of apparent agency (or agency by

employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by
the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular
business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957).
77. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 439-40; Icenogle, supranote 72,
§ 2[b], at 632-33 (noting thatin determining control, courts have considered such factors as "the
scheduling of the physician's time, who supplies material needed by the physician, whether the
physician is free to practice elsewhere, who determines the physician's fees and bills the patients
for the physician's services, and who is custodian of the medical records"); see also Dunn v.
Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (listing various provisions of a
contract between a physician and a hospital which collectively precluded a directed verdict for
the hospital on the question ofamaster-servantrelationship); Willoughby v. Willdns, 310 S.E.2d
90, 95-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
78. For a survey of jurisdictions applying the doctrines of actual agency and
respondeat superior in the emergency room context, see Icenogle, supra note 72, §§ 8-9.
79. CompareDunn, 606 A.2d at 869 (holding an HMO liable for a physician's action
because ofagency and direct-employmentrelationships), with Latham v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,
594 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding insufficient hospital control over a
physician to establish a master-servant relationship).
80. See McWilliams & Russell, supranote 3, at 442-44.
81. Id. at445.
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estoppelf 2 is very fact-driven. Moreover, changing public perception of
hospitals has influenced the doctrine. As noted above, principals are not liable
for the physical torts oftheir independent contractors. While analysis based on
the doctrine of actual agency never really reaches this rule, apparent agency
analysis operates as an exception. The doctrine of apparent agency is described
in the Restatement (Second) ofAgency as follows:
One who represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby causes a
third person justifiably to rely upon the care
or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused
by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as
if he were such. 3
The Shuler court's three-part test' is typical of traditional apparent
agency analysis. This analysis differs from actual agency analysis in its primary
focus on the plaintiff's reasonable expectations rather than on the contract and
overall relationship between the alleged controlling principal and his agent. The
traditional theory of apparent agency "is not in any way agency-based. Indeed,
where agency is present, apparent agency is superfluous. Rather, [the
Restatement] is based upon the elements of estoppel: a representation causing
justifiable reliance and resulting harm."" s
One of the earliest applications, even though only a nominal
application,8" of the doctrine of apparent agency to hospitals was the California
Supreme Court's decision in Seneris v. Haas." Over half of the states have

82. McWilliams and Russell characterized agency by estoppel as a "close cousin" of
apparent agency, id. at 445-46, and noted that apparent agency has application in tort and
contract while agency by estoppel has application in contract only. Id. at 445-46 nn.75-76.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).
84. Shuler v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 313 S.C. 225, 227, 437 S.E.2d 128, 129-30
(Ct. App. 1993) (requiring that theplaintiff"prove: (1) that the purported principal consciously
or impliedly represented another to be his agent; (2) that there was a reliance upon the
representation; and (3) that there was a change of position to the relying party's detriment").
85. McWilliams & Russell, supranote 3, at 447.
86. Id. at 446 n.77.
87. 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955). The California Supreme Court applied the following
three-part test:
(First) The person dealing with the agent must do so
with belief in the agent's authority and this belief
must be a reasonable one; (second) such belief must
be generated by some act or neglect of the principal
sought to be charged; (third) and the third person in
relying on the agent's apparent authority must not be
guilty of negligence.
Id. at 927. As noted below, such a nonrigorous application of the doctrine of apparent agency
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followed.8 However, the doctrine's widespread acceptance has wrought
equally widespread versions of its application. 9 Similar to the analysis and
results when courts have applied the actualagency theory, application of the
apparentagency theory varies widely from state to state9" and even within
certain states. 9'
McWilliams and Russell characterized these varying, and largely
nonrigorous, applications of the apparent agency doctrine to hospitals as
follows: "It might be said that these courts have developed anew, policy-based
''
doctrine by loosely adopting the outlines of traditional apparent agency. 9
Furthermore, McWilliams and Russell made three important points. First, many
courts have come to realize that strict application of the doctrine presents a
nearly insurmountable hurdle for the injured patient seeking imputation of
liability to the hospital.93 Second, the courts have recognized the importance of
the plaintiff's perception of the treating hospital as well as the public's
perception of the treating hospital and, in some cases, hospitals in general. 9
Third, decisions relaxing the required analysis are largely result-oriented. 95
McWilliams and Russell ultimately concluded that collectively these decisions
signal the need for a "new, hospital-specific doctrine of liability based on

is not inconsistent with subsequent decisions and analysis in otherjurisdictions.
88. Icenogle, supra note 72, § 10, at 645-48 (providing cases from 29 jurisdictions
that have applied the doctrine of apparent agency in the hospital emergency room context).
89. After recognizing one court for its "unusually accurate application of [the
Restatement]," McWilliams and Russell noted that "[o]ther courts, however, assume away or
ignore great chunks of the required analysis." McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 451.
90. Compare Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 554-55 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (characterizing the doctrine as "agency on the basis of estoppel" and considering the
traditional elements of equitable estoppel: induced reliance and change ofposition), with Chase
v. Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing a
variation of the apparent agency theory and concluding that "an HMO may be liable if the HMO
creates an appearance that the physician is its employee, regardless of a physician's actual
status").
91. Compare Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53
(Ohio 1994) (concluding that, under the doctrine ofagency by estoppel, a hospital maybe liable
"if it holds itself out to the public as a provider ofmedical services and in the absence of notice
or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to the individual
practitioner, to provide competent medical care"), with Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d
1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing and accepting "the doctrine of agency by estoppel akin to
Section 267 of the Restatement").
92. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 448.
93. Id. ("For all the doctrine's facial attractiveness, the requisites of apparent
agency-a representation causing reasonable reliance and resulting harm-would present
substantial difficulties for plaintiffs if applied with rigor by the courts in the hospital context."
(footnote omitted)).
94. Id. ("Confronted with the flowing tide of changing public perception, however,
courts have employed the doctrine [of apparent agency] without rigor and, arguably, have much
damaged it in the process." (footnote omitted)).
95. Id. at 451 ("[Courts] advance policy justifications for outcomes favorable to the
plaintiff, but such justifications are result-oriented, hospital-specific, and emanate from the
changing public perception of hospitals." (footnote omitted)).
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public policy."9 6
D.

Corporate-Practice-of-MedicineDoctrine as a Defense to
Agency Theories

The corporate-practice-of-medicine doctrine provides that medicine
can be practiced only by an individual and not by a corporation.' Thus, a
hospital itselfcannot practice medicine9 and seemingly cannot control or have
the right to control those individuals who do. This would seem to be a bulletproof defense for a hospital facing liability for the negligent acts of its
physicians, whether they be employees or independent contractors." However,
the viability of this defense has been virtually eliminated in cases involving
employee physicians' 0 as courts have focused on hospital "control over the
methods and materials of practice"'' rather than control over the decisionmaking, skill, and other professional aspects of a physician's work." 2 In some
jurisdictions the corporate-practice doctrine continues to have limited viability
as a defense to imputed liability based on the torts of physicians acting as

96. Id. at 451. Indeed, an important suggestion made by McWilliams and Russell is
that the best basis for hospital liability for independent contractor physicians is a variety of
nondelegable duty labeled "nondelegability based on reliance." Id. at 457-62. The basis of this
theory is section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to
perform services for another which are accepted in
the reasonable belief that the services are being
rendered by the employer or by his servants, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
negligence of the contractor in supplying such
services, to the same extent as though the employer
were supplying them himself or by his servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). McWilliams and Russell concluded that the
strained application of traditional apparent agency theory would have fit better under section
429. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 460-62; see also Icenogle, supra note 72, § 2[a],
at 629. ("In the context of medical malpractice... the distinction between doctrine derived
from... [section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and section 267 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency] has been erased and the terms 'apparent authority' and 'authority by
estoppel' are treated synomously ....).
97. See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The CorporatePractice
ofMedicineDoctrine:
An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry,40 VAND. L. REv. 445,446-47 (1987).
98. See Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (noting
that an HMO "could not practice medicine"); McMillan v. Durant, 312 S.C. 200, 203 n.2, 439
S.E.2d 829, 831 n.2 (1993) ("A hospital as an entity cannot practice medicine, diagnose an
illness, or establish a course of treatment ....).
99. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 441.
100. Id.
101. Icenogle, supranote 72, § 2[b], at 632.
102. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 441 & n.52.
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independent contractors," 3 but as noted by McWilliams and Russell, in many
others it is "criticized as an anachronism and an obstacle to innovative health
care refonn."'O'
E.

Minor Doctrines: Ratification and Inherently Dangerous
Activity

Two additional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for
principals for the torts of their independent contractors are worthy of mention.
The doctrine of ratification is a relatively minor doctrine by which the liability
of an independent contractor can be imputed to a principal even when actual
agency or apparent agency has not been established.' The doctrine applies
when a principal knows of a tort committed by his agent and acts in a manner
viewed as accepting the benefits of the tortious act."° Although there are no
known cases in South Carolina and very few cases in other jurisdictions
applying ratification to hospitals," 7 the doctrine couldbe used by an emergency
room plaintiff under an appropriate set of facts.
The characterization of an activity as inherently dangerous is another
vehicle by which courts have imputed liability to noncontrolling principals. The
doctrine operates in similar fashion to the imposition of a nondelegable duty in
that principals are held strictly liable for their agents' tortious conduct if
committed while engaged in a certain category of activity. 8 Inherently
dangerous activities are those "in which there is ahigh degree ofriskinrelation
to the particular surroundings, or some rather specific risk or set of risks to
those in the vicinity, recognizable in advance as calling for definite
precautions."'0 9 This doctrine is relatively minor and courts that have
considered whether specific nonemergency medical services were inherently
dangerous have concluded that they were not insofar as medical services, when

103. Id. at 441-42. See, e.g., Banks v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 558 F. Supp.
1334, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983) (applying Colorado law and concluding that an earlier recognition
of the corporate-practice doctrine by the same court required dismissal of "any claim attempting
to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of [the doctors]" practicing in its
emergency room).
104. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 442 (footnote omitted).
105. See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS 654 (2d ed. 1997).
106. Id. (footnote omitted) ("For example, if a principal knowingly accepts the
benefits of fraud by his agent, he has ratified the wrongful conduct and made himself liable even
if the agent was an independent contractor.").
107. See, e.g., Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185, 1194
(Idaho 1992) (concluding that a jury could not find that the hospital had ratified the grossly
negligent conduct of a nurse).
108. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 456.
109. KEETONETAL.,supra note 20, § 71, at 514 (footnote omitted).
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provided properly, are not dangerous."' Likewise, in the one known case in
which this question was considered with respect to emergency room services,
the Missouri Court of Appeals reached the same result."' In short, given the
other theories of liability available to modern plaintiffs and courts, this doctrine
is not likely to gain widespread acceptance or otherwise significantly affect
hospital liability for emergency room physicians.
IV.

CONCLUSION: EFFECT OF THE NEW RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

Short-term Implications

The full effect of the Simmons rule remains uncertain and may be
altered by the South Carolina Supreme Court. As noted earlier, the rule has
immediate and far reaching implications in the emergency room context.
Alleged victims of emergency room malpractice have immediate access to
another, possibly deeper, pocket for relief. If Simmons does stand as the new
rule, the best course for hospitals currently using independent contractors in the
emergency room may be to assume complete control over emergency
operations. Thus, hospitals will exert more control over the quality of care
provided and will capture the profits currently accruing to the independent
contractor operators.' 2 Such a tactical reaction will not be inconsistent with
strategic efforts toward vertical integration, which is the industry's trend.
However, among South Carolina's smaller, independent hospitals, the
elimination of an important advantage of contracting out emergency room
services and the resulting necessity of taking over emergency room operations
may well be the proverbial last straw. These small hospitals will either face
acquisition or alliances with larger organizations." 3

110. See, e.g., Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443,445 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979) (finding that taking x-rays was not an inherently dangerous activity); Rosenberg v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 595 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that administering
an electrocardiogram was not an inherently dangerous activity).
111. See Kelly v. St. Luke's Hosp., 826 S.W.2d 391, 395-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(affining the trial court's holding that "the practice of emergency medicine is not an inherently
dangerous activity").
112. Foregoing these profits was previously justified as a cost of avoiding liability.
However, in a post-Simmons environment, no such reason for foregoing these profits exists, and
the hospitals will likely need these profits to cover, or at least to offset, the costs associated with
the additional liability. Such costs will likely be primarily in the form of higher insurance
premiums.
113. McWilliams and Russell have suggested that South Carolina policy makers
should consider whether "all hospitals should be treated alike, or should be subject to varying
legal regimes depending upon the nature of the hospital (i.e., profit versus nonprofit, private
versus public, private nonprofit community versus private nonprofit religious, etc.)."
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 472 n.245.
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Implicationsfor Liability Beyond the Emergency Room

Looking beyond the immediate influence on emergency room
operations, the decision in Simmons may have longer-term implications for
other areas of hospital liability. Because of the specific public policy basis of
the court's decision, the immediate effect of the Simmons decision will be
limited to the emergency room context and not extended to other cases in
which physicians provide medical services within hospital facilities. A holding
based on either actual or apparent agency theory as the exception to the general
rule of nonliability would likely have had immediate application to other, and
maybe all, instances in which physicians provide services on hospital premises.
At the very least, such a holding would be only a short extension away from
general applicability. From this standpoint, the hospitals and their advisors may
find that, if a finding of liability was inevitable, the public policy basis adopted
by the Simmons court was perhaps the best basis for such a holding.
On the other hand, the public policy (public perception) basis could
prove to be the worst possible basis for liability from the standpoint of the
hospital industry. The idea that hospital liability should be determined by how
hospitals, either individually or collectively, are perceived by their users and
the public could be given such elasticity by the courts that hospital liability may
quickly expand. Hospitals could find themselves liable 1for
the negligent acts
4
of all physicians performing services on their premises.'
In conclusion, the long-term implications of Simmons aside, the court's
recognition of changing public perceptions of hospitals has buried the idea of
a hospital as a charitable "sanctuar[y] where medical care is made available."'1" 5
Such a change and the accompanying effect on hospital liability can hardly be
considered a surprise by the investors, managers, and advisors of hospitals that
have been the beneficiaries of the changed public perception and have
experienced tremendous economic success over the last decade.
Edwin L. Barnes, Jr.

114. This is the same potential result, although reached through a different method
ofanalysis, as if the Simmons court had based its decision on either an actual or apparent agency
theory.
115. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 434.
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